I am a citizen of the United States and a representative of the American Nation of people. The US Government is merely an administrative unit which has vastly overreached its legitimate powers. Unfortunately most Americans — and perhaps most people elsewhere — confuse the US Government with the American Nation. The former is nothing. It is a puff of smoke, an idea, a structure, a system of rules and regulations, a soul-less machine. Unfortunately it is a very dangerous machine.

The American Nation, on the other hand, is a living and breathing thing. It is the collective of human beings — bodies, hearts, minds, and souls.

The US Government seeks war. Thus this vast machine perpetuates itself, grows, and, through fear, seeks to impede the intelligence, good will, happiness, altruism, and vision of the American people; otherwise the American people would rise up and replace the Government.

George W. Bush and the US Congress represent the American Government, but I, in my way, represent the American Nation. I am a graybeard and have both that right and responsibility. Moreover, I am quite likely one of the few who even bother to claim this right.

Therefore in response to recent US Government saber-rattling towards Iran, I offer a different message: one of friendship and respect towards the Iranian People (but not towards the Iranian Government, which has, to the people of Iran, roughly the same relationship as the US Government has to the American people).

On July 4, American Independence Day, I placed this webpage online:

ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/jsuebersax/ip.htm

dedicated to the noble tradition of Islamic and Persian Neoplatonist philosophers. May Western and Middle-Eastern people come better to understand our common intellectual heritage. Better still, may we come to understand that God has providentially granted that we may collaborate in activities such as philosophy for the advancement of humankind, to His glory.

Breaking headline:

Iraq report rips U.S. leaders : Senators: Invasion misused intelligence.

Don’t you think this is a little late?

Yes, the Bush administration lied. They willingly exaggerated the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) as a pretext for invading Iraq. And you (John D. Rockefeller, the Senate Intelligence Committee, and the rest of the U.S. Congress) are just figuring this out? Where were you in 2003? Or after the invasion, when our troops failed to find any evidence of WMD production? Why didn’t you pass a resolution to leave Iraq then, when the country could have still saved thousands of casualties and a trillion dollars?

I don’t suppose any of you happened to watch Secretary of State Colin Powell’s ludicrous address to the U.N. Security Council in Feburary 2003. There he tried to make the case for a U.S. invasion based on a supposed Iraq WMD development program. Obviously, in appearing before the Security Council Powell was going to give his best shot — and supply the most compelling evidence possible. Instead everyone was treated to a shabby PowerPoint presentation with highly ambiguous photos of trailers — supposedly portable WMD factories, but which could have been just about anything. No substantial evidence of WMD production was supplied — and that itself was revealing. The real message to anyone discerning and attentive was that the U.S. had no evidence of WMD production in Iraq!

Powell made an utter fool of himself. One got the impression that he hated every minute of it, but was pressured by the Bush administration to make the presentation.

And what about the repeated protests of Hans Blix, the U.N. weapons inspector — who was *in* Iraq, who repeatedly insisted that there was no WMD program? Why didn’t the U.S. Congress listen to him?

Okay, so the Bush administration lied. Fine. We shouldn’t pass that by too lightly. But, still, in a sense, one expects ruling administrations to lie. You have to maintain healthy skepticism. Nodoby forces you to swallow everything they say hook, line, and sinker.

The bigger problem, if you ask me, is that Senate *believed* the Bush administration (or pretended to).

So excuse me, Senate Intelligence Committee. If you’re saying now that the Bush administration grossly lied about the WMDs, then by implication you’re also saying that you didn’t do your job at the time. You should have recognized that the Administration was lying. Instead you just played along. And why not? If America benefited from the Iraq War, then you could claim some of the credit. And if (as it’s turned out), the war became a fiasco, then you could just blame Bush — as you’re doing now.

As Lincoln said, you can’t fool all of the people all of the time. At least one citizen — me — is calling you on this. The U.S. Senate should have objected to Bush’s march to war. And by not doing so, they are just as much to blame as the Bush administration.

And as far as I’m concerned, the whole lot of you — anyone who voted for the war — should be summarily drummed out of office (and without a pension!).

Rep. Dennis Kucinich has drafted a plan for ending the US military involvement in Iraq.

http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_rep__den_070108_the_kucinich_plan_fo.htm

“There is a compelling need for a new direction in Iraq, one that recognizes the plight of the people of Iraq, the false and illegal basis of the United States war against Iraq, the realities on the ground which make a military resolution of the conflict unrealistic and the urgent responsibility of the United States, which caused the chaos, to use the process of diplomacy and international law to achieve stability in Iraq, a process which will establish peace and stability in Iraq allow our troops to return home with dignity.”

These are the elements of the Kucinich Plan:

1. The US announces it will end the occupation, close military bases and withdraw.

2. US announces that it will use existing funds to bring the troops and necessary equipment home.

3. Order a simultaneous return of all US contractors to the United States and turn over all contracting work to the Iraqi government.

4. Convene a regional conference for the purpose of developing a security and stabilization force for Iraq.

5. Prepare an international security and peacekeeping force to move in, replacing US troops who then return home.

6. Develop and fund a process of national reconciliation.

7. Reconstruction and Jobs.

8. Reparations.

9. Political Sovereignty.

10. Iraq Economy.

11. Economic Sovereignty.

12. International Truth and Reconciliation.

Credit is due the mayor and people of Rome for speaking out against the death penalty.

As the Roman Colosseum is a place sanctified by martyrs’ blood, may the demonstration have the force of prayer.

http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,,21023287-5005961,00.html

ROME lit up the arches of its ancient Colosseum at dusk overnight to protest against the death penalty after Saddam Hussein’s hanging, with the mayor calling it the city’s symbol to the world for human rights.

A crowd of about 50 demonstrators holding banners looked on as the monument, where gladiators once fought gory battles to death, flickered with yellow lights against a blue sky.

“The Colosseum originally was a place of persecution and unspeakable violence,” Mayor Walter Veltroni said. “But now it is a symbol of peace and reconciliation.”

The hanging of the former Iraqi dictator has touched a nerve in Italy, setting off a wave of appeals against the death penalty and prompting a hunger strike from Radical Party leader Marco Pannella, who thanked the mayor from his hospital bed for lighting up the Colosseum.

Italy is also spearheading a campaign for a UN moratorium on the death penalty.

“The execution of Saddam Hussein has stirred a debate,” said Michele Lembo, a demonstrator outside the Colosseum. “We ask people to think about what happened and propose an alternative.”

I protest the planned use of capital punishment in the cases of Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti and Awad Hamed al-Bandar.

Both men were convicted in connection with the killing of 148 men of the city of Dujail and with other reprisals against the civilian population of the city following a failed assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein in 1982.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dujail

While the harsh actions taken against the population of Dujail are to be condemned, they do not justify the use of capital punishment.

Moreover, the Iraqi government has an opportunity to promote in a tangible way peace in Iraq by exercising clemency.

John Uebersax

We pursue here a logical analysis of the question: Should Saddam Hussein be granted clemency and not executed?

1. Argument from the Nature of a Head of State

It is unseemly to execute a former head of state. It violates the dignity of the office. Regardless of his or her offenses, a head of state represents a nation and is, on that basis, entitled to a certain level of additional respect. It is the office, not the person, that is so respected.

Respect for the office derives from the respect for the people who are represented, and for the principle of government itself, which is a noble enterprise, separates us from the animals, and is the cause of much that is positive in human affairs.

In the course of duties as head of state, a leader might engage in behaviors that are later judged or seen to be illegal, inhumane, or criminal. However the question will always remain about the extent to which these were actions undertaken at the leader’s personal initiative and  own selfish ends only, or how much these actions expressed the political aims of a group or faction of the public, whether a majority or a minority.

It is seldom, if ever, the case that a tyrant remains in office without the compliance of the public. What then, shall we do in the name of Justice? Shall we execute the leader’s advisers? Shall we execute all members of factions or interest groups that actively supported the despot? What of those who gave indirect support by their silence and inaction?  Where is the line to be drawn?

2. Argument from the Principle of ScapegoatingFor as far back as there is recorded history we may witness the rise and fall of despots; how they are first supported by a populus that knows (or ought to know) full well his intentions and likely actions. The pattern–which we may see for example repeatedly in ancient Rome–is to tolerate or encourage a despot; then, when the cynical and selfish aims which benefit the country or faction are met, the tyrant is unceremoniously deposed and killed.

The tyrant is at first the designated agent of genocide or criminal intent, acting out the motives of the collective “shadow” of the majority or the political faction. He then becomes the scapegoat by which the others try to purge their own guilt. All this the devil of human malice views with relish and satisfaction.

3. Argument from the Possibility of United States Compliance

Let us further examine the possible contributing role of the United States. Is it not true that the United States supported Hussein in his early years of power; that the US was only too glad to have a political strong man holding together Iraq as a counterbalance to Iran and Saudi Arabia; that the US supplied many arms to Iraq; that some of these same arms were used by him against his people; and that, because Hussein was hostile to Iran, the support continued despite obvious human rights violations?

So is not the US in some way partly complicit–though admittedly in an indirect way, but complicit nonetheless–in some of Hussein’s crimes?

4. Argument from the Natural Repugnance of Capital Punishment

This argument is familiar and need not be elaborated upon. It is simply that to take a human life unnecessarily is :

a. morally wrong

b. counterproductive and paradoxical: if one wishes to prevent future murders, genocide, violence, etc., that is done by establishing and promoting respect for human life.

But killing when it is not necessary–especially when there is a plainly emotional component to the killing–exemplifies, reinforces, and perpetuates the very things that capital punishment seeks to oppose and end.

5. Argument from Opportunity of Positive Precedent

We profess a wish to affirm peace, goodness, virtue, respect, and nonviolence as a way of life. If that is truly our aim, then we have a unique and ideal opportunity to further it in the granting of clemency to Saddam Hussein. He could be sentenced to life imprisonment, for example.

This would be an act of singular and decisive historical importance. It would announce to the world (and to ourselves): No more of this barbarous violence! No more of this hideous cruelty of man against man! It is this we hate, not a single person.

Objection 1: What of the Victims of Hussein’s Cruelty?

Reply. We must not neglect to consider the innocent victims. Would that we could bring them back to life, or to compensate their families for their suffering. Alas, we cannot do the former. The latter is a possibility–but who is suggesting that? If that is the goal, would not our attention and efforts be better directed to that than to Hussein’s trial and public ridicule?

Objection 2: What of Others Convicted and Sentenced to Execution for Lesser Crimes?

Reply. The argument above concerning capital punishment generally applies to all so sentenced, and implies that we should suspend the death penalty generally. That is already the case in many or most nations.

Objection 3: To Suggest Such a Thing Shows Weakness and Cowardice

Reply. Our true enemy is human malice, which preys upon the human soul. Let us seek out and destroy this, our true enemy. That is what takes real courage, fortitude, determination, etc. To prop up a dictator when expedient (as in doing the dirty work of special interest groups), and then execute him when that it is expedient–that is cowardice.

Objection 4: He Does Not Deserve Mercy.

Reply. It is the very nature of mercy that it is extended to those undeserving. If you seek mercy yourself, if you have ever received mercy, if you will seek it in the future: extend it to others. “Blessed are the merciful.”

Conclusion

All lines of analysis here support the conclusion that clemency should be extended to Saddam Hussein.

I append to these comments this link concerning the comments of Vatican official, Cardinal Renato Martino, president of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace.

http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0606300.htm

–
December 28, 2006
John Uebersax PhD

The Iraq Study Group Report
James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs

Summary: 79 Specific Recommendations of the Report

OUTLINE

II. The Way Forward–A New Approach

A. The External Approach: Building an International Consensus
1. The New Diplomatic Offensive
2. The Iraq International Support Group
3. Dealing with Iran and Syria
4. The Wider Regional Context

B. The Internal Approach: Helping Iraqis Help Themselves
1. Performance on Milestones
2. National Reconciliation
3. Security and Military Forces
4. Police and Criminal Justice
5. The Oil Sector
6. U.S. Economic and Reconstruction Assistance
7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, and Review
8. U.S. Personnel
9. Intelligence

RECOMMENDATIONS

Section II. The Way Forward — A New Approach

A. The External Approach: Building an International Consensus

1. The New Diplomatic Offensive

RECOMMENDATION 1: The United States, working with the Iraqi government, should launch the comprehensive New Diplomatic Offensive to deal with the problems of Iraq and of the region. This new diplomatic offensive should be launched before December 31, 2006.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The goals of the diplomatic offensive as it relates to regional players should be to:

i. Support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.

ii. Stop destabilizing interventions and actions by Iraq’s neighbors.

iii. Secure Iraq’s borders, including the use of joint patrols with neighboring countries.

iv. Prevent the expansion of the instability and conflict beyond Iraq’s borders.

v. Promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political support, and, if possible, military assistance for the Iraqi government from non-neighboring Muslim nations.

vi. Energize countries to support national political reconciliation in Iraq.

vii. Validate Iraq’s legitimacy by resuming diplomatic relations, where appropriate, and reestablishing embassies in Baghdad.

viii. Assist Iraq in establishing active working embassies in key capitals in the region (for – example, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia).

ix. Help Iraq reach a mutually acceptable agreement on Kirkuk.

x. Assist the Iraqi government in achieving certain security, political, and economic milestones, including better performance on issues such as national reconciliation, equitable distribution of oil revenues, and the dismantling of militias.

RECOMMENDATION 3: As a complement to the diplomatic offensive, and in addition to the Support Group discussed below, the United States and the Iraqi government should support the holding of a conference or meeting in Baghdad of the Organization of the Islamic Conference or the Arab League both to assist the Iraqi government in promoting national reconciliation in Iraq and to reestablish their diplomatic presence in Iraq.

2. The Iraq International Support Group

RECOMMENDATION 4: As an instrument of the New Diplomatic Offensive, an Iraq International Support Group should be organized immediately following the launch of the New Diplomatic Offensive.

RECOMMENDATION 5: The Support Group should consist of Iraq and all the states bordering Iraq, including Iran and Syria; the key regional states, including Egypt and the Gulf States; the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council; the European Union; and, of course, Iraq itself. Other countries for instance, Germany, Japan and South Korea–that might be willing to contribute to resolving political, diplomatic, and security problems affecting Iraq could also become members.

RECOMMENDATION 6: The New Diplomatic Offensive and the work of the Support Group should be carried out with urgency, and should be conducted by and organized at the level of foreign minister or above. The Secretary of State, if not the President, should lead the U.S. effort. That effort should be both bilateral and multilateral, as circumstances require.

RECOMMENDATION 7: The Support Group should call on the participation of the office of the United Nations Secretary-General in its work. The United Nations Secretary-General should designate a Special Envoy as his representative.

RECOMMENDATION 8: The Support Group, as part of the New Diplomatic Offensive, should develop specific approaches to neighboring countries that take into account the interests, perspectives, and potential contributions as suggested above.

3. Dealing with Iran and Syria

RECOMMENDATION 9: Under the aegis of the New Diplomatic Offensive and the Support Group, the United States should engage directly with Iran and Syria in order to try to obtain their commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq and other regional issues. In engaging Syria and Iran, the United States should consider incentives, as well as disincentives, in seeking constructive results.

RECOMMENDATION 10: The issue of Iran’s nuclear programs should continue to be dealt with by the United Nations Security Council and its five permanent members (i.e., the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) plus Germany.

RECOMMENDATION 11: Diplomatic efforts within the Support Group should seek to persuade Iran that it should take specific steps to improve the situation in Iraq. Among steps Iran could usefully take are the following:

* Iran should stem the flow of equipment, technology, and training to any group resorting to violence in Iraq.

* Iran should make clear its support for the territorial integrity of Iraq as a unified state, as well as its respect for the sovereignty of Iraq and its government.

* Iran can use its influence, especially over Shia groups in Iraq, to encourage national reconciliation.

* Iran can also, in the right circumstances, help in the economic reconstruction of Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 12: The United States and the Support Group should encourage and persuade Syria of the merit of such contributions as the following:

* Syria can control its border with Iraq to the maximum extent possible and work together with Iraqis on joint patrols on the border. Doing so will help stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and out of Iraq.

* Syria can establish hotlines to exchange information with the Iraqis.

* Syria can increase its political and economic cooperation with Iraq.

4. The Wider Regional Context

RECOMMENDATION 13: There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon and Syria, and President Bush’s June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine.

RECOMMENDATION 14: This effort should include–as soon as possible–the unconditional calling and holding of meetings, under the auspices of the United States or the Quartet (i.e., the United States, Russia, European Union, and the United Nations), between Israel and Lebanon and Syria on the one hand, and Israel and Palestinians (who acknowledge Israel’s right to exist) on the other. The purpose of these meetings would be to negotiate peace as was done at the Madrid Conference in 1991, and on two separate tracks–one Syrian/Lebanese, and the other Palestinian.

RECOMMENDATION 15: Concerning Syria, some elements of that negotiated peace should be:

* Syria’s full adherence to UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of August 2006, which provides the framework for Lebanon to regain sovereign control over its territory.

* Syria’s full cooperation with all investigations into political assassinations in Lebanon, especially those of Rafik Hariri and Pierre Gemayel.

* A verifiable cessation of Syrian aid to Hezbollah and the use of Syrian territory for transshipment of Iranian weapons and aid to Hezbollah. (This step would do much to solve Israel’s problem with Hezbollah.)

* Syria’s use of its influence with Hamas and Hezbollah for the release of the captured Israeli Defense Force soldiers.

* A verifiable cessation of Syrian efforts to undermine the democratically elected government of Lebanon.

* A verifiable cessation of arms shipments from or transiting through Syria for Hamas and other radical Palestinian groups.

* A Syrian commitment to help obtain from Hamas an acknowledgment of Israel’s right to exist. * Greater Syrian efforts to seal its border with Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 16: In exchange for these actions and in the context of a full and secure peace agreement, the Israelis should return the Golan Heights, with a U.S. security guarantee for Israel that could include an international force on the border, including U.S. troops if requested by both parties.

RECOMMENDATION 17: Concerning the Palestinian issue, elements of that negotiated peace should include:

* Adherence to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and to the principle of land for peace, which are the only bases for achieving peace.

* Strong support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority to take the lead in preparing the way for negotiations with Israel.

* A major effort to move from the current hostilities by consolidating the cease-fire reached between the Palestinians and the Israelis in November 2006.

* Support for a Palestinian national unity government.

* Sustainable negotiations leading to a final peace settlement along the lines of President Bush’s two-state solution, which would address the key final status issues of borders, settlements, Jerusalem, the right of return, and the end of conflict.

RECOMMENDATION 18: It is critical for the United States to provide additional political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan, including resources that might become available as combat forces are moved from Iraq.

B. The Internal Approach: Helping Iraqis Help Themselves

1. Performance on Milestones

RECOMMENDATION 19: The President and the leadership of his national security team should remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership. These contacts must convey a clear message: there must be action by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones. In public diplomacy, the President should convey as much detail as possible about the substance of these exchanges in order to keep the American people, the Iraqi people, and the countries in the region well informed.

RECOMMENDATION 20: If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, and support for Iraq’s security forces, and to continue political, military, and economic support for the Iraqi government. As Iraq becomes more capable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself, the U.S. military and civilian presence in Iraq can be reduced.

RECOMMENDATION 21: If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.

RECOMMENDATION 22: The President should state that the United States does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq. If the Iraqi government were to request a temporary base or bases, then the U.S. government could consider that request as it would in the case of any other government.

RECOMMENDATION 23: The President should restate that the United States does not seek to control Iraq’s oil.

Milestones for Iraq

RECOMMENDATION 24: The contemplated completion dates of the end of 2006 or early 2007 for some milestones may not be realistic. These should be completed by the first quarter of 2007.

RECOMMENDATION 25: These milestones are a good start. The United States should consult closely with the Iraqi government and develop additional milestones in three areas: national reconciliation, security, and improving government services affecting the daily lives of Iraqis. As with the current milestones, these additional milestones should be tied to calendar dates to the fullest extent possible.

2. National Reconciliation

Steps for Iraq to Take on Behalf of National Reconciliation

RECOMMENDATION 26: Constitution review. Review of the constitution is essential to national reconciliation and should be pursued on an urgent basis. The United Nations has expertise in this field, and should play a role in this process.

RECOMMENDATION 27: De-Baathification. Political reconciliation requires the reintegration of Baathists and Arab nationalists into national life, with the leading figures of Saddam Hussein’s regime excluded. The United States should encourage the return of qualified Iraqi professionals–Sunni or Shia, nationalist or ex-Baathist, Kurd or Turkmen or Christian or Arab–into the government.

RECOMMENDATION 28: Oil revenue sharing. Oil revenues should accrue to the central government and be shared on the basis of population. No formula that gives control over revenues from future fields to the regions or gives control of oil fields to the regions is compatible with national reconciliation.

RECOMMENDATION 29: Provincial elections. Provincial elections should be held at the earliest possible date. Under the constitution, new provincial elections should have been held already. They are necessary to restore representative government.

RECOMMENDATION 30: Kirkuk. Given the very dangerous situation in Kirkuk, international arbitration is necessary to avert communal violence. Kirkuk’s mix of Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen populations could make it a powder keg. A referendum on the future of Kirkuk (as required by the Iraqi Constitution before the end of 2007) would be explosive and should be delayed. This issue should be placed on the agenda of the International Iraq Support Group as part of the New Diplomatic Offensive.

RECOMMENDATION 31: Amnesty. Amnesty proposals must be far-reaching. Any successful effort at national reconciliation must involve those in the government finding ways and means to reconcile with former bitter enemies.

RECOMMENDATION 32: Minorities. The rights of women and the rights of all minority communities in Iraq, including Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Yazidis, Sabeans, and Armenians, must be protected.

RECOMMENDATION 33: Civil society. The Iraqi government should stop using the process of registering nongovernmental organizations as a tool for politicizing or stopping their activities. Registration should be solely an administrative act, not an occasion for government censorship and interference.

Steps for the United States to Take on Behalf of National Reconciliation

RECOMMENDATION 34: The question of the future U.S. force presence must be on the table for discussion as the national reconciliation dialogue takes place. Its inclusion will increase the likelihood of participation by insurgents and militia leaders, and thereby increase the possibilities for success.

RECOMMENDATION 35: The United States must make active efforts to engage all parties in Iraq, with the exception of al Qaeda. The United States must find a way to talk to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Moqtada al-Sadr, and militia and insurgent leaders.

RECOMMENDATION 36: The United States should encourage dialogue between sectarian communities, as outlined in the New Diplomatic Offensive above. It should press religious leaders inside and outside Iraq to speak out on behalf of peace and reconciliation.

RECOMMENDATION 37: Iraqi amnesty proposals must not be undercut in Washington by either the executive or the legislative branch.

Militias and National Reconciliation

RECOMMENDATION 38: The United States should support the presence of neutral international experts as advisors to the Iraqi government on the processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

RECOMMENDATION 39: The United States should provide financial and technical support and establish a single office in Iraq to coordinate assistance to the Iraqi government and its expert advisors to aid a program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia members.

3. Security and Military Forces

A Military Strategy for Iraq

RECOMMENDATION 40: The United States should not make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 41: The United States must make it clear to the Iraqi government that the United States could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if Iraq does not implement its planned changes. America’s other security needs and the future of our military cannot be made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqi government.

RECOMMENDATION 42: We should seek to complete the training and equipping mission by the first quarter of 2008, as stated by General George Casey on October 24, 2006.

RECOMMENDATION 43: Military priorities in Iraq must change, with the highest priority given to the training, equipping, advising, and support mission and to counterterrorism operations.

RECOMMENDATION 44: The most highly qualified U.S. officers and military personnel should be assigned to the imbedded teams, and American teams should be present with Iraqi units down to the company level. The U.S. military should establish suitable career-enhancing incentives for these officers and personnel.

RECOMMENDATION 45: The United States should support more and better equipment for the Iraqi Army by encouraging the Iraqi government to accelerate its Foreign Military Sales requests and, as American combat brigades move out of Iraq, by leaving behind some American equipment for Iraqi forces.

Restoring the U.S. Military

RECOMMENDATION 46: The new Secretary of Defense should make every effort to build healthy civil-military relations, by creating an environment in which the senior military feel free to offer independent advice not only to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon but also to the President and the National Security Council, as envisioned in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.

RECOMMENDATION 47: As redeployment proceeds, the Pentagon leadership should emphasize training and education programs for the forces that have returned to the continental United States in order to “reset” the force and restore the U.S. military to a high level of readiness for global contingencies.

RECOMMENDATION 48: As equipment returns to the United States, Congress should appropriate sufficient funds to restore the equipment to full functionality over the next five years.

RECOMMENDATION 49: The administration, in full consultation with the relevant committees of Congress, should assess the full future budgetary impact of the war in Iraq and its potential impact on the future readiness of the force, the ability to recruit and retain high-quality personnel, needed investments in procurement and in research and development, and the budgets of other U.S. government agencies involved in the stability and reconstruction effort.

4. Police and Criminal Justice

Recommended Iraqi Actions

RECOMMENDATION 50: The entire Iraqi National Police should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, where the police commando units will become part of the new Iraqi Army.

RECOMMENDATION 51: The entire Iraqi Border Police should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, which would have total responsibility for border control and external security.

RECOMMENDATION 52: The Iraqi Police Service should be given greater responsibility to conduct criminal investigations and should expand its cooperation with other elements in the Iraqi judicial system in order to better control crime and protect Iraqi civilians.

RECOMMENDATION 53: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should undergo a process of organizational transformation, including efforts to expand the capability and reach of the current major crime unit (or Criminal Investigation Division) and to exert more authority over local police forces. The sole authority to pay police salaries and disburse financial support to local police should be transferred to the Ministry of the Interior.

RECOMMENDATION 54: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should proceed with current efforts to identify, register, and control the Facilities Protection Service.

U.S. Actions

RECOMMENDATION 55: The U.S. Department of Defense should continue its mission to train the Iraqi National Police and the Iraqi Border Police, which should be placed within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.

RECOMMENDATION 56: The U.S. Department of Justice should direct the training mission of the police forces remaining under the Ministry of the Interior.

RECOMMENDATION 57: Just as U.S. military training teams are imbedded within Iraqi Army units, the current practice of imbedding U.S. police trainers should be expanded and the numbers of civilian training officers increased so that teams can cover all levels of the Iraqi Police Service, including local police stations. These trainers should be obtained from among experienced civilian police executives and supervisors from around the world. These officers would replace the military police personnel currently assigned to training teams.

RECOMMENDATION 58: The FBI should expand its investigative and forensic training and facilities within Iraq, to include coverage of terrorism as well as criminal activity.

RECOMMENDATION 59: The Iraqi government should provide funds to expand and upgrade communications equipment and motor vehicles for the Iraqi Police Service.

RECOMMENDATION 60: The U.S. Department of Justice should lead the work of organizational transformation in the Ministry of the Interior. This approach must involve Iraqi officials, starting at senior levels and moving down, to create a strategic plan and work out standard administrative procedures, codes of conduct, and operational measures that Iraqis will accept and use. These plans must be drawn up in partnership.

RECOMMENDATION 61: Programs led by the U.S. Department of Justice to establish courts; to train judges, prosecutors, and investigators; and to create institutions and practices to fight corruption must be strongly supported and funded. New and refurbished courthouses with improved physical security, secure housing for judges and judicial staff, witness protection facilities, and a new Iraqi Marshals Service are essential parts of a secure and functioning system of justice.

5. The Oil Sector

Short Term

RECOMMENDATION 62:

* As soon as possible, the U.S. government should provide technical assistance to the Iraqi government to prepare a draft oil law that defines the rights of regional and local governments and creates a fiscal and legal framework for investment. Legal clarity is essential to attract – investment.

* The U.S. government should encourage the Iraqi government to accelerate contracting for the comprehensive well work-overs in the southern fields needed to increase production, but the United States should no longer fund such infrastructure projects.

* The U.S. military should work with the Iraqi military and with private security forces to protect oil infrastructure and contractors. Protective measures could include a program to improve pipeline security by paying local tribes solely on the basis of throughput (rather than fixed amounts).

* Metering should be implemented at both ends of the supply line. This step would immediately improve accountability in the oil sector.

* In conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. government should press Iraq to continue reducing subsidies in the energy sector, instead of providing grant assistance. Until Iraqis pay market prices for oil products, drastic fuel shortages will remain.

Long Term

RECOMMENDATION 63:

* The United States should encourage investment in Iraq’s oil sector by the international community and by international energy companies.

* The United States should assist Iraqi leaders to reorganize the national oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in order to enhance efficiency, transparency, and accountability.

* To combat corruption, the U.S. government should urge the Iraqi government to post all oil contracts, volumes, and prices on the Web so that Iraqis and outside observers can track exports and export revenues.

* The United States should support the World Bank’s efforts to ensure that best practices are used in contracting. This support involves providing Iraqi officials with contracting templates and training them in contracting, auditing, and reviewing audits.

* The United States should provide technical assistance to the Ministry of Oil for enhancing maintenance, improving the payments process, managing cash flows, contracting and auditing, and updating professional training programs for management and technical personnel.

6. U.S. Economic and Reconstruction Assistance

RECOMMENDATION 64: U.S. economic assistance should be increased to a level of $5 billion per year rather than being permitted to decline. The President needs to ask for the necessary resources and must work hard to win the support of Congress. Capacity building and job creation, including reliance on the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, should be U.S. priorities. Economic assistance should be provided on a nonsectarian basis.

RECOMMENDATION 65: An essential part of reconstruction efforts in Iraq should be greater involvement by and with international partners, who should do more than just contribute money. They should also actively participate in the design and construction of projects.

RECOMMENDATION 66: The United States should take the lead in funding assistance requests from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and other humanitarian agencies.

Coordination of Economic and Reconstruction Assistance

RECOMMENDATION 67: The President should create a Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq.

Improving the Effectiveness of Assistance Programs

RECOMMENDATION 68: The Chief of Mission in Iraq should have the authority to spend significant funds through a program structured along the lines of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, and should have the authority to rescind funding from programs and projects in which the government of Iraq is not demonstrating effective partnership.

RECOMMENDATION 69: The authority of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction should be renewed for the duration of assistance programs in Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 70: A more flexible security assistance program for Iraq, breaking down the barriers to effective interagency cooperation, should be authorized and implemented.

RECOMMENDATION 71: Authority to merge U.S. funds with those from international donors and Iraqi participants on behalf of assistance projects should be provided.

7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, and Review

RECOMMENDATION 72: Costs for the war in Iraq should be included in the President’s annual budget request, starting in FY 2008: the war is in its fourth year, and the normal budget process should not be circumvented. Funding requests for the war in Iraq should be presented clearly to Congress and the American people. Congress must carry out its constitutional responsibility to review budget requests for the war in Iraq carefully and to conduct oversight.

8. U.S. Personnel

RECOMMENDATION 73: The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence should accord the highest possible priority to professional language proficiency and cultural training, in general and specifically for U.S. officers and personnel about to be assigned to Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 74: In the short term, if not enough civilians volunteer to fill key positions in Iraq, civilian agencies must fill those positions with directed assignments. Steps should be taken to mitigate familial or financial hardships posed by directed assignments, including tax exclusions similar to those authorized for U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 75: For the longer term, the United States government needs to improve how its constituent agencies–Defense, State, Agency for International Development, Treasury, Justice, the intelligence community, and others–respond to a complex stability operation like that represented by this decade’s Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the previous decade’s operations in the Balkans. They need to train for, and conduct, joint operations across agency boundaries, following the Goldwater-Nichols model that has proved so successful in the U.S. armed services.

RECOMMENDATION 76: The State Department should train personnel to carry out civilian tasks associated with a complex stability operation outside of the traditional embassy setting. It should establish a Foreign Service Reserve Corps with personnel and expertise to provide surge capacity for such an operation. Other key civilian agencies, including Treasury, Justice, and Agriculture, need to create similar technical assistance capabilities.

9. Intelligence

RECOMMENDATION 77: The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should devote significantly greater analytic resources to the task of understanding the threats and sources of violence in Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 78: The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should also institute immediate changes in the collection of data about violence and the sources of violence in Iraq to provide a more accurate picture of events on the ground.

Recommended Iraqi Actions

RECOMMENDATION 79: The CIA should provide additional personnel in Iraq to develop and train an effective intelligence service and to build a counterterrorism intelligence center that will facilitate intelligence-led counterterrorism efforts.

(Transcribed/edited from report by John S. Uebersax, December 8, 2006)

Most Americans Perceive a Negative Effect of Iraq War

Since March 2003, the Gallup Organization has conducted regular–every one or two months–polls of American attitudes towards the Iraq war. The results here are from the March 2006 wave.

Question 23. Do you think that U.S. involvement in the war against Iraq has had a positive effect on life in the United States generally, a negative effect on life in the United States, or hasn’t it had much effect on life in the United
States generally?

                  Positive   Negative   Not much   No
Date              effect     effect     effect     opinion

2006 Mar 10-12      21         58        18         3

Earlier results

2004 Jan 2-5        39         35        25         1
2003 Oct 24-26      32         33        33         2
2003 Apr 22-23      52         18        29         1

This question is asked to roughly half the sample, or about 500 adults. The other half of the sample is asked a similar question about perceived effect of the war “on you personally.” Responses to that question show a similar trend.

A complete report can be found here:

http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/03/16/iraq.poll/

Conference Announcement
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Engaging The OTHER

October 26-29, 2006 – Kalamazoo, Michigan USA

www.cbiworld.org

An International Conference examining concepts of “The OTHER” from a multidisciplinary, cross-cultural perspective to promote wider public dialogue about concepts of “Us and Them.”

Sponsored by the Common Bond Institute, in collaboration with HARMONY Institute, the International Humanistic Psychology Association, Fetzer Institute, and Western Michigan University.

Goal: The focus of the program is to explore the dimensions and dynamics of “The OTHER” on both an individual and group basis, including fear-based belief systems, negative projection, negative stereotypes, prejudice, and scapegoating. Concepts are explored through psychological (intra-personal and inter-personal), social, cultural, anthropological, historical, philosophical, and spiritual perspectives.

Example themes:

• The Other – as humankind’s oldest and most resilient foe.
• Our shared identity as The Other.
• The role of religious belief systems in requiring the presence and embodiment of innate evil in the world, and an ever-present Other as it’s expression.
• Dynamics of the energy of fear and exclusive group identity in formulating devaluing, dehumanizing and demonizing stereotypes that allow result in objectifying entire groups to the point of justifying inhumane treatment.

Conference website:

http://www.cbiworld.org/Pages/Conferences_ETO.htm

The Second World Congress of Imams and Rabbis for peace took place in Seville (Sevilla), Spain from 19 to 22 March 2006.

From their final declaration:

“In the name of the One Creator and Master of the Universe, the Compassionate and All Merciful, we Muslim and Jewish leaders and representatives, gathered for the Second World Congress of Imams and Rabbis for Peace organized by Hommes de Parole in Seville, in the region of Andalusia – recalling the past era in which Jews and Muslims lived together here in harmony and mutual enrichment – and aspiring for such relations today and in the future.”

“We accordingly affirm that contrary to widespread misrepresentation, there is no inherent conflict between Islam and Judaism, on the contrary. While modern politics has regrettably impacted negatively upon the relationship, our two religions share the most fundamental values of faith in the One Almighty whose name is Peace, who is merciful, compassionate and just; and who calls on us human beings to manifest these values in our lives and to advance them in relation to all persons whose lives and dignity are sacred.”

“We call upon the political leaders of all peoples to work for righteous and peaceful durable solutions around the world and in particular in the Holy Land for the benefit of all peoples and faith-communities who live in the land and hold it dear.”

Link:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Congress_of_Imams_and_Rabbis_for_Peace